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The paper presents a survey of known results and some.new 
developments in the use of re.ference objectives --that is, any 
reasonable or desirable point in the objective space--instead 
of weighting coefficients in multiobjective optimization. The 
main conclusions are as follows: 
-- Any point in the objective space--no matter whether it. is 
attainable or not, ideal or not--can be used instead of weight- 
ing coefficients to derive scalarizing functions which have 
minima at Pareto points only. Moreover, entire basic theory 
of multiobjective optimization--necessary and sufficient con- 
ditions of optimality and existence of Pareto-optimal solutions, 
etc. --can be developed with the help of reference objectives 
instead of weighting coefficients or utility functions. 
-- Reference objectives are very practical means for solving 
a number of problems such as Pareto-optimality testing, scanning 
the set of Pareto-optimal solutions, computer-man interactive 
solving of multiobjective problems, group assessment of solu- 
tions of multiobjective optimization or cooperative game prob- 
lems, or solving dynamic multiobjective optimization problems. 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
This paper is aimed at a revaluation of some basic assump- 
tions in multicriteria optimization and decision-making from a 
pragmatical point of view, addressing the question why the known, 
highly developed methods and techniques in multicriteria analysis 
are not fully operational in applications. It is assumed that 
the reader is well acquainted with the state-of-the-art in multi- 
criteria analysis as represented, for example, by [2,3,7,9,12] 
and that he has also encountered some of the vexing problems in 
the applications of this highly developed theory. The basic 
question in applications of multicriteria analysis is, in fact, 
only one though it may take various forms: 
-- What is more valuable? - the perfection of a compromise 
based on a model which is never perfect, or the time of 
a top-rank decision maker? If confronted with a multi- 
tude of questions "would you prefer this alternative to 
the other one?", would not the decision maker simply 
send the analyst back to where he belongs? 
. -- - -  
-- Does a decision maker think in terms of trade-offs and 
weighting coefficients or is he rather concerned with 
aspiration levels and values? 
-- Has a decision maker consistent preferences, which under 
known assumptions could be revealed in the form of a 
utility function, or does he simply want to attain 
certain goals? 
-- IS it easier in applications to determine marginal rates 
of substitution between various objectives, or to choose 
reasonable ranges or scales for those objectives? 
-- Is a  compromise i n  a  group of  d e c i s i o n  makers a t t a i n e d  
through a  b a l a n c e  o f  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  o r  r a t h e r  by an 
agreement on g o a l s ?  
-- Is n o t  t h e  t e r m  " a  d e c i s i o n  maker" an  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  con- 
v e n i e n t  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s t ?  O r  do w e  r a t h e r  d e a l  w i t h  
d e c i s i o n  making o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a s  u s u a l ,  where t h e  top-  
l e v e l  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  based on a  c a r e f u l  and ex t remely  
w e l l  prepa red ,  b u t  h i g h l y  i n t u i t i v e  a p p r a i s a l  o f  a  few 
c r u c i a l  i n d i c e s ?  
Many s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n s  can be  s t a t e d  and a l l  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  
have puzzled many r e s e a r c h e r s .  I n  f a c t ,  some r e c e n t  papers  -- 
see Ackoff 1979, [ I ]  - - go  a s  f a r  a s  ques t i on ing  e n t i r e l y  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  v a l u e  o f  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  and o p t i m i z a t i o n .  Some 
a u t h o r s  p r e f e r  a  r e t r e a t  t o  pu re ly  h e u r i s t i c a l  ~ r o c e d u r e s  f o r  
d e c i s i o n  making t o  p sycho log i ca l ,  " s o f t - s c i e n c e "  approaches .  
,Though having much r e s p e c t  f o r  c a r e f u l ,  l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s  of a  
problem, f o r  deep  i n t u i t i o n  and psychology,  I a m  n o t  e n t i r e l y  
convinced.  I would r a t h e r  a d d r e s s  ano the r  q u e s t i o n ,  which i n  a  
s e n s e  summarizes a l l  t h e  above doubts :  
\ 
-- What i s  wrong w i t h  t h e  b a s i c  t o o l s  o f  m u l t i c r i t e r i a  
a n a l y s i s ?  Should w e  n o t  reexamine i t s  b a s i c  axioms? 
H i s t o r i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n  can h e l p  u s  i n  r each ing  t h i s  g o a l .  
When, i n  1896, P a r e t o  [ 1 7 ] h a s  formulated t h e  founda t i ons  of  
m u l t i c r i t e r i a  o p t i m i z a t i o n  and used weigh t ing  c o e f f i c i e n t s  t o  
t h i s  end,  he opened an e n t i r e  f i e l d  o f  r e s e a r c h .  Weighting co- 
e f f i c i e n t s  p l a y  t h e r e f o r e  a  c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  contemporary 
paradigm o f  m u l t i c r i t e r i a  a n a l y s i s  - - a l l  neces sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m a l i t y ,  a l l  e q u i l i b r i a  and t r ade -  
o f f s ,  a l l  u t i l i t y  maximizat ion i s  b a s i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  weigh t ing  
c o e f f i c i e n t s .  When t h e  founda t i ons  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  economic 
e q u i l i b r i u m  theo ry  w e r e  fo rmula ted ,  a  consumer was assumed t o  
maximize a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  r e p r e s e n t i n g  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  
o f  commodity bundles  - -what ,  i n  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  d i r e c t l y  c o r r e -  
sponds t o  P a r e t o  weigh t ing  c o e f f i c i e n t s  forming a  l i n e a r  approxi-  
mat ion o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  Th i s  was a  most s a t i s f a c t o r y  
development o f  economic t h e o r y  and s t i l l  i s  a  contemporary p a r t  
o f  i t s  b a s i c  paradigm. I t  h a s  a l s o  found con f i rma t ion  i n  empir- 
i c a l  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  f r e e  m a r k e t - - a s  f a r  a s  any market  i s  f u l l y  
f r e e  -- and r e s u l t e d  i n  f u r t h e r  deep t h e o r e t i c a l  s t u d i e s  p rov id ing  
for an axiomatic basis of preference orderings and utility theory 
at a high mathematical level (see e .g. , Debreu 1 959 [5] ) . 
But here is a place for reflection: while a nameless agent 
on a free market may be well described by his utility function, 
no individual thinks in terms of preferences of commodity bundles 
when buying in a supermarket. When I am going to do some shopping, 
I know that I have to buy, for example, a quantity of milk, sugar, 
bread, and a shirt for my son; if I have enough money, I might 
also buy a toy for him and a tool for my gardening. In fact, I 
am thinking in terms of goals; if they are attainable, I might 
want to improve them. Moreover, my way of thinking does not 
change very much when I have to make decisions as a science 
manager. 
However, further extensive studies [2,9,12] on decision 
making with multiple objectives were related strongly to pref- 
erences and utility theory. Identification methods for indi- 
vidual and group preferences as well as utility functions have 
been developed; statistical approaches have been considered to 
take into account uncertainty and risks; and even interactive 
procedures devised to involve a decision maker more directly 
into decision analysis have been based on learning about his 
preferences. Moreover, most of the applied studies in multi- 
objective optimization and decision making are implicitly or 
explicitly formulated in terms of weighting coefficients, trade- 
offs and utility functions. 
On the other hand, many researchers have realized the need 
of an alternative approach. Savlukadze [20,211 and others consid- 
ered the use of utopia points as unattainable objective values 
representing some aspiration levels. Dyer [6] , Kornbluth [I 31 and 
others introduced goal programming --the use of variable bounds 
on objective values in an interactive process of multicriteria 
optimization. Yet these and related works have not had the 
impact they deserved because of several reasons. 
First, it was not clear whether it is possible to develop 
a consistent, basic theory of multiobjective optimization and 
decision making based on the use of reference objectives-- 
t h a t  i s ,  any d e s i r a b l e  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  f o r  o b j e c t i v e s  -- 
r a t h e r  than weighting c o e f f i c i e n t s .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  neces- 
s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  e x i s t e n c e  cond i t ions ,  r e l a t i o n s  
t o  prefe rence  o r d e r i n g s ,  e t c . ,  had t o  be formulated i n  terms of 
r e fe rence  o b j e c t i v e s .  This  ques t ion  has been a t t ached  t o  some 
of  my e a r l i e r  works [22,23,25] ;  a  s y n t h e s i s  and f u r t h e r  develop- 
ment of r e l e v a n t  r e s u l t s  is  presented  i n  t h e  nex t  chap te r  of 
t h i s  paper. 
Second, t h e  use  of r e f e rence  o b j e c t i v e s  imp l i e s  a  choice  of 
d i s t a n c e  o r  norm i n  o b j e c t i v e  space and t h i s  choice  has  been con- 
s i d e r e d ,  e r roneous ly ,  a s  being e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  choice  of 
. weighting c o e f f i c i e n t s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  work wi th  r e f e r e n c e  objec-  
t i v e s  one has ,  admi t t ed ly ,  t o  choose reasonable  s c a l e s  o r  ranges  
f o r  a l l  c r i t e r i a .  But t h e  choice  of  a  reasonable  range i s  in -  
h e r e n t  t o  any computation o r  measurement and does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
imply t h e  choice  of t r a d e - o f f s .  A f t e r  having made a  d e c i s i o n  
based on r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e  corresponding weight ing co- 
e f f i c i e n t s  can be a p o s t e r i o r i  determined ( s e e  nex t  chap te r )  and 
examined. This  i s  one of t h e  l i n k s  between t h e  theo ry  based on 
r e fe rence  o b j e c t i v e s  and t h e  more c l a s s i c a l  t heo ry ,  b u t  it does 
n o t  impede t h e  p r a c t i c a l  u se fu lnes s  of  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e s .  
Thi rd ,  t h e  use  of r e f e rence  o b j e c t i v e s  has  n o t  been widely 
t e s t e d  i n  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  and va r ious  problems r e l a t e d  t o  cons ider -  
a t i o n  of u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  t o  group d e c i s i o n  making, t o  i n t e r a c t i v e  
procedures of d e c i s i o n  making, e t c . ,  have n o t  been so lved  y e t .  
Another chap te r  of t h i s  paper is  devoted t o  t h e s e  problems. 
2 .  BASIC THEORY 
Fund am en& 
Let  E o C E  be a  s e t  of  admiss ib le  d e c i s i o n s  o r  c o n t r o l s  o r  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  be eva lua t ed .  W e  do n o t  s p e c i f y  y e t  t h e  n a t u r e  
of space E. Let  G be t h e  space o f  o b j e c t i v e  va lues  o r  performance 
i n d i c e s  o r  g o a l s .  We assume t h a t  G i s  a H i l b e r t  space,  o u t  of 
s e v e r a l  reasons .  F i r s t ,  some a b s t r a c t  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  H i l b e r t  
space --mostly t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of a  p r o j e c t i o n  on a  cone - - s i m -  
p l i f y  t h e  reasoning and proofs .  Second, a  H i l b e r t  space i s  t h e  
least abstract one that includes trajectories of dynamical sys- 
tems or probability distributions and we would like to consider 
also dynamical trajectories or probability distributions as pos- 
sible goals of multiobjective optimization. Third, the Euclidean 
n 
space E is a (finite-dimensional) Hilbert space, and we can 
therefore use graphical illustrations and intuition to comment 
on results. 
Let a mapping Q :Eo +G be given, defining numerically the 
consequences of each decision or alternative. Let Qo = Q(EO) C G  
be the set of attainable objectives. To choose between them, 
suppose a partial preordering in G is given by means of a positive 
cone (any closed, convex, proper cone) D $ G: 
A corresponding strong partial preordering in G can be definedby: 
Suppose, t6 simplify theexpositioqthatwe areinterested inmini- 
mizing all the objectives (losses, risks, etc.). In the Hilbert 
space G, we define correspondingly a minimal element of Qo with 
respect to the partial preordering (1) or a D-minimal element of 
Qo : 
Let us denote by a0 the set of all D-minimal points in Qo. 1f 
2 2 1 2  G = R  andD = R +  = {(q , q ) € R  :q l > O t q  - - > 01. then a D-minimal 
point of Qo is Pareto-minimal, see Figure 1. In fact, in finite- 
dimensional cases we are mostly concerned with Pareto-minimal 
points; the possibility of using other positive cones illustrates 
only possible generalizations of infinite-dimensional spaces. 
FIGURE 1. D-MINIMAL POINTS AND SETS: 
a) PARETO-MINIMAL POINTS 
b) MORE GENERAL D-MINIMAL POINTS 
One of t h e  most important  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  p a r t i a l  p reorder ings  
induced by a  p o s i t i v e  cone i n  H i l b e r t  space i s  t h a t  we can g i v e  
a  p r e c i s e  answer t o  t h e  t y p i c a l  ques t ion :  g iven  two outcomes q l ,  
q2  which a r e  incomparable ( t h a t  i s ,  n e i t h e r  q l  < q 2  nor q2 <ql  ) , 
what i s  t h e  p a r t  of  q2  t h a t  has  improved wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  q l ?  
The answer r e s u l t s  from t h e  fol lowing lemma. 
Lemma 7 ( P r o j e c t i o n s  on Cones i n  a  H i l b e r t  Space --Moreau 
1962 [ I  6]).. Given  a  H i l b e r t  space  G and a  c l o s e d ,  c o n v e x  cone  
D C G ,  each  e l e m e n t  q E G  c a n  be  u n i q u e l y  and o r t h o g o n a Z l y  de -  
composed i n t o  i t s  p r o j e c t i o n s  on  t h e  cones  -D and D* = 
{q* E G  : ( q * , q )  LO VqED): 
n h e ~ e  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n s  q-D and qD* a r e  d e f i n e d  b y :  
-D - ( 5 )  q  = a rg  min Ilq -qll ; 
- qD* = arg-min II q - FJII . 
q  E -D q E D* 
and ( . , = )  d e n o t e s  t h e  s c a l a r  p r o d u c t ,  I I * I 1  d e n o t e s  t h e  norm. 
The cone D* is called the dual cone; -D and D* are called 
2 2 D* - 
mutually polar. If D = R+, then D* = D = R+, and q - 
A 
1 L (max(0,q ),max(O,q ) )  is just the vector composed of the posi- 
tive components of the vector q. This is interpreted in Figure2, 
where Lemma I is applied to the difference a2 - ql = q in order 
to discern the part of q2 that has improved when compared to ql 
and the other part that is worse than ql. 
The projection on a cone has several additional useful 
properties of norm-minimality, Lipschitz-continuity, ~rgchgt- 
differentiability of its square norm, etc. - see Wierzbicki and 
Kurcyusz 1977 [24] . 
FIGURE 2. DETERMINATION OF THE NEGATIVE AND THE POSITIVE PART 
2 
OF q2 - q1 VIA PROJECTION ON CONES: a) D = R - + '  
b) MORE GENERAL CASE 
Ohdm- Phu ehving Fundona  and P&y Scdahiza t ion;  
Suddicient CondLtiona doh M L L e R ; i & ~  Optbn&.Ay 
Now we approach the basic question in the use of reference 
objectives in multicriteria optimization: given any aspiration 
level or reference objective ~ E G ,  can we construct a scalar- 
1 izing function s : G xQO + R  which is strictly order-preserving 
in its second argument (thus can be considered as a type of 
arbitrarily chosen utility function) ? Recall that s (q,q) is 
strictly order-preserving in q, iff: 
and t h a t  each  minimal p o i n t  o f  a  s t r i c t l y  D-order -p rese rv ing  
f u n c t i o n  is  a  D-minimal p o i n t  (see, e . g . ,  [ 5 ,231  ) : 
( 7 )  6 = a r g  min s ( q , q )  ( e - a ) n ~ ,  = + . 
q  EQO 
The answer t o  t h e  above q u e s t i o n  is  n o t  o n l y  p o s i t i v e  b u t  a l s o  
vague: t h e r e  a r e  many s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  s t r i c t l y  
o rd e r - p r e s e rv ing .  For  example, choose any v e c t o r  of p o s i t i v e  
we igh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t s  - -or ,  more g e n e r a l l y ,  Lagrange m u l t i -  
p l i e r s  X € * = {q* € G : ( q* , q  ) > 0 Yq € 51, where b* i s  c a l l e d  t h e  
q u a s i - i n t e r i o r  o f  D* - and d e f i n e  t h e  known l i n e a r  f u n c t i o n  
s (q,q) = ( x , q  - q ) which i n  t h e  s i m p l e s t  c a s e  i s  j u s t  t h e  sum o f  
n i i - i  
weighted  o b j e c t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  igl X ( q  - q ) . T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  
s t r i c t l y  o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g ,  and each  o f  i t s  minimal p o i n t s  i s  
D-minimal, o r  Pare to-minimal .  But t h e  minimal p o i n t s  o f  t h i s  
f u n c t i o n  do  n o t  depend on t h e  i n fo rma t ion  c o n t a i n e d  i n  6 and 
r e q u i r e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  con t a ined  i n  A .  T h e r e f o r e ,  w e  shou ld  
look f o r  n o n l i n e a r  s t r i c t l y  o rde r -p r e se rv ing  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  do 
n o t  r e q u i r e  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of we igh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t s  X and 
have minima dependent  on t h e  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  q. One such 
f u n c t i o n  ha s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  form: 
s ( 9 , q )  = -Ilq-qll + pll (q  - q )  D* 11 
o r  t o  p r ov ide  f o r  d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y  
where p > 1  is  an a r b i t r a r y  s c a l a r  c o e f f i c i e n t .  These f u n c t i o n s  
a r e  c a l l e d  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s .  One of  t h e  b a s i c  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  is  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
Lemma 2 (Wierzb ick i  1975, [22]). .  If G is a Hilbert space, 
D C G  is a closed convex cone satisfying the condition D E D * ,  
and p > 1, than, for any IE G, the function s (qlq) defined by 
( 8 1  o r  ( 8 a )  is strictly order-preserving. 
Observe,  f i r s t ,  t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  D C D *  i s  n o t  v e r y  re- 
n 
s t r i c t i v e ,  s i n c e  i f  D = E+, t hen  D* = D ~ D * ;  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n  means t h a t  t h e  cone D should  n o t  b e  " t o o  b road" .  
Secondly ,  obse rve  t h a t  t h e  lemma is  v a l i d  f o r  any E G  and, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  g e n e r a l i z e s  and p u t s  two known approaches  i n t o  a  
common frame: u t o p i a  p o i n t  approach,  where <$!Q~  and QO c q  + D 
( a  p o i n t  q s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  l a s t  r equ i rement  i s  c a l l e d  D-preceding 
Q o )  , and g o a l  programming approach,  where < E  Q ~ .  I n  f a c t ,  ob- 
s e r v e  t h a t  i f  Q0 cG + D ,  t h e n  ~ - ~ E D _ C D *  f o r  a l l  q E Q o ,  and 
- (q -qlD*= q -  q ;  t h u s ,  f u n c t i o n  (8a)  t a k e s  t h e  form s ( q , q )  = 
( p  - 1 )  U q  - i l l 2  and w e  minimize t h e  d i s t a n c e  from p o i n t  q t o  Q O ,  
see F i g u r e  3a. I f  < E Q ~  i s  a t t a i n a b l e ,  t h e n  t h e r e  are a lways  
p o i n t s  q  E QO such t h a t  ~q - D, (CJ -41D* = 0,  and s ( < , q )  = 
- 2 I q  - q  , see F i g u r e  3b. Now, minimizing t h e  minus norm o r  
maximizing t h e  norm of t h e  o b j e c t i v e  improvement q - q , s u b j e c t  
t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  ~ - G E - D  i s  a v a r i a n t  o f  goal-programming: 
w e  would l i k e  t o  g e t  t h e  b e s t  p o i n t  (& i n  F igu re  3b) w e  can  
once t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  a r e  s a t i s f i e d .  But t h e  b a s i c  prop- 
e r t y  o f  t h e  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  (8)  o r  (8a )  i s  t h a t  t h e  addi-  
- 
t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t  q - q ~ - D  need n o t  be  t r e a t e d  as a ha rd  con- 
s t r a i n t ;  i t s  v i o l a t i o n  i s  exp re s sed  by t h e  p e n a l t y  t e rm 
p I1 (q  - g) D* 11 2 ,  as a s o f t  c o n s t r a i n t .  Even i f  t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  
- 
q  a r e  s l i g h t l y  v i o l a t e d  (depending on t h e  p e n a l t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  p ,  
see F i g u r e  3b) a t  a minimal p o i n t  6 of  s ( q , q )  , t h e  p o i n t  i s  
D-minimal. And, f i n a l l y ,  i f  n e i t h e r  ~ E Q ~  n o r  Q O c <  + D, see 
7 i g u r e  3 c ,  t hen  t h e  known approaches  cou ld  n o t  u se  t h e  informa- 
t i o n  con t a ined  i n  q ,  whereas  t h e  min imiza t ion  of f u n c t i o n  (8 )  
and (8a)  s t i l l  r e s u l t s  i n  a D-minimal p o i n t .  
Thus, any d e s i r a b l e  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  p o i n t  < can  b e  used 
t o  de te rmine  a  cor responding  D-minimalpoint 6 .  The l a t t e r  depends 
c l e a r l y  n o t  o n l y  on r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  q, b u t  a l s o  on t h e  pen- 
a l t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  P and t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  norm chosen ( o r  on t h e  
s c a l i n g  of  s e p a r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s ) .  But t h i s  dependence h a s  o n l y  
t e c h n i c a l  c h a r a c t e r :  w e  do n o t  assume t h a t  a  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  
of t h e  form (8)  o r  ( 8a )  r e p r e s e n t s  the utility function o f  a  
g iven  d e c i s i o n  maker, w e  r a t h e r  u s e  t h i s  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  t o  
approximate l o c a l l y  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e s  (and h i s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  
i f  he a c t u a l l y  h a s  o n e )  v i a  an i n t e r a c t i v e  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h r o u g h  
a s k i n g  him q u e s t i o n s  h e  u n d e r s t a n d s  w e l l .  An i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  
such  a p r o c e d u r e  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  F i g u r e  3d. The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
q u e s t i o n  i s :  "You have asked  u s  t o  a t t a i n  o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s  
- 
- -1 -2 q i  - (q i ,q i ,  ... ) .  The best w e  can  d o  under  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  
A1 A2 
o u r  model i s  ai = ( q i , q i , . . .  ) . DO you a c c e p t  t h i s ,  o r  would 
you l i k e  t o  modify y o u r d e s i r e d  l e v e l s  t o  some ci+l - 
1  -2 
t9i+l I . ) ? I n  t h e  l a t t e r  case, p l e a s e  s p e c i f y  new de- 
s i r e d  l e v e l s . "  Obv ious ly ,  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  can  have many v a r i a n t s :  
t h e  a n a l y s t  c a n  re spond  w i t h  more t h a n  one  Gi t o  a g i v e n  qi by 
v a r y i n g  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  p ,  o r  t h e  norm, o r  even  by a p p l y i n g  
s p e c i a l l y  d e s i g n e d  v a r i a t i o n s  AC i n  o r d e r  t o  p r e s e n t  t h e  de- i 
c i s i o n  maker w i t h  more t h a n  one  a l t e r n a t i v e .  B u t  t h e  b a s i c  i d e a  
remains  t h e  same: t o  a s k  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker a b o u t  a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l s  and n o t  a b o u t  p r e f e r e n c e s  
a 1 
F I G U R E  3 .  MINIMAL P O I N T S  O F  THE PENALTY S C A L A R I Z I N G  FUNCTION ( 8 ) :  
a) WHEN IS D-PRECEDING Q - b) WHEN IS ATTAINABLE; 
C )  WHEN q Is N E I T H E R  D - P m & D I N G  NOR ATTAINABLE;  
d) AN I N T E R A C T I V E  PROCEDURE 
Necendatry Candtt iom, RdaLian lto ~ e i g k t i n g  Coe66iciev~tb, and 
Exhltence 06 M L L e t j C h i t h  O p i h n d  Soha%ond 
The scalarizing function (8) or (8a) has other useful prop- 
erties. The most important one is that of order-approximation: 
the level set SO = {q EG : s(q,q) 10) approximates the set of 
improvement <-D from above and arbitrarily- closely for suf- 
ficiently large p - see Figure 4a. More precisely, the following 
lemma holds: 
Lemma 3  (Wierzbicki 1977, [23] ) . Denote 
D E  = I ~ E G  : dist(qrD) =llq -D*~ < ~ U q l l } .  For a r b i t r a r i l y  
smal l  E ,  choose  p > E-2. Then t h e  l e v e l  s e t  So o f  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  ( 8 )  o r  ( 8 a )  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e l a t i o n :  
From this lemma, the following necessary condition of D-minimal- 
ity can be easily deduced: 
Lemma 4 (General Necessary Condition of Multicriteria 
Optimality). If G i s  a  H i l b e r t  space  w i t h  a  p o s i t i v e  
cone DCD*, and i f  6 i s  a  DE-minimal p o i n t  o f  QO = Q(E) 
( t h a t  i s ,  i f  ($ - E E )  nQo = @ w i t h  6 ,  = D E  \ ( D ,  n-D,) and 
D E  d e f i n e d  a s  i n  Lemma 31, t h e n  
( 1  0) min s(G,q) = 0 
q EQO 
where s(3,q) i s  d e f i n e d  a s  i n  ( 8 )  o r  ( 8 a )  w i t h  p >max(l ,E-~) 
and t h e  minimum i n  ( 1 0 )  i s  a t t a i n e d  a t  q = $. Moreover, 
i f  $ E Q ~  i s a t t a i n a b l e  b u t  n o t  DE-minimal, t h e n  min s ($,q) <O. 
I f  Q G Q ~  i s  n o t  a t t a i n a b l e ,  t h e n  min s(e,q) >O. qEQo 
qEQ0 
In contrast to the known necessary conditions of multi- 
criteria optimality via weighting coefficients A ,  Lemma 4 is 
easily applicable and valid even for nonconvex sets Qo of 
attainable objectives. Lemma 4, in fact, corresponds to sup- 
porting the set Qo at $ by the set So contained in the cone 
6 - D E ,  while the known necessary conditions of multicriteria 
o p t i m a l i t y  co r r e spond  t o  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  se t  Qo a t  6 by a  
hyperp lane ,  c f .  F i g u r e  4a ,b .  
FIGURE 4. NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF MULTICRITERIA OPTIMALITY: 
a) GENERAL CASE, WITH THE USE OF PENALTY SCALARIZING FUNCTIONS; 
A 
b) CONVEX CASE, WITH THE USE OF WEIGHTING COEFFICIENTS A .  
I t  i s  a l s o  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  ob- 
j e c t i v e  6 i s  n o t  D-minimal, t h e  cor responding  minimal p o i n t  6 
o f  t h e  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  ( 8 a )  d e f i n e s  u n i q u e l y  a  r e l a t e d  
v e c t o r  X of we igh t i ng  c o e f f i c i e n t s :  
Lemma 5 (A P o s t e r i o r i  De te rmina t ion  of Weighting Co- 
e f f i c i e n t s ,  1 2 5 1 ) .  Suppose  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  Lemma 2 
a r e  s a t i s f i e d  and Ze t  $ be  a  m in ima l  p o i n t  o f  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  (Ba) ,  4 # <. Suppose  Qo i s  t o c a t t y  c o n v e x  i n  
a  ne ighborhood  o f  6 .  Then:  
i s  a  ( n o r m a l i z e d )  v e c t o r  o f  w e i g h t i n g  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a t  6, 
A 
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  s e t  SO = {q E G  : ( ~ , q  - 4 ) 2 O )  s u p p o r t s  t o c a t t y  
t h e  s e t  QO a t  G.  
Another r e s u l t  of  r a t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  impor tance ,  r e l a t e d  
t o  t h e  n o t i o n  of  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  i s  t h e  f o l l owing  s imp le  
lemma : 
Lemma 6 (Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of 
Multicriteria Optimal Solutions). Suppose t h e r e  e x i s t s  
a  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  q such t h a t  t h e  s e t  (q - D) nQO 
i s  nonempty and ( w e a k l y )  compact.  Then t h e r e  e x i s t  
D-minimal p o i n t s  6 o f  t h e  s e t  QO. 
This lemma has been given in [22] under the additional 
assumption that the cone D* has nonempty quasi-interior 
6* = {q* EG : (q*,q) > 0 Vq €51, and was proved via consider- 
ation of the linear form ( X,q) , XE~*. But we can omit the 
additional assumption, since the function (8a) is weakly lower 
semicontinuous, see [24], and thus has a minimum in (q -  D) nQo 
under the assumptions of the lemma. This minimum is a D-mini- 
ma1 point of the set (q-D) "a0, hence also of the set QO. 
n If G is finite-dimensional with the Euclidean norm, G = E , 
n 
and D = E+, then the penalty scalarizing function (8a) takes 
the form: 
which might be convenient for nonlinear dependence of qi on the 
decision variables x EEO, but is not convenient for multicriteria 
linear programming problems. However, penalty scalarizing func- 
tions based on other norms in R", that is, the sum of absolute 
values norm: 
or the maximum (Chebychev) norm 
(1 4) s(c,q) = - maxlqi - ~ ~ l  + pmax (0.q i - q  -i ) 
i i 
possess almost all properties of the function (12) : if p > 1, 
then the function (13) is strictly order-preserving in q for 
any and the function (14) is order-preserving (hence her 
minimal p o i n t s  are Pareto-minimal e x c e p t  i n  some d e g e n e r a t e  
c a s e s ) .  These f u n c t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  o rder -approx imat ing ,  see [ 2 5 1 .  
i I f  t h e  dependence of  q  on d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s  x E E o  i s  l i n e a r ,  
t h e n  t h e  min imiza t ion  o f  f u n c t i o n s  (1 3 )  , ( I  4 )  can be  reduced 
a f t e r  t y p i c a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  i n t o  l i n e a r  programming problems.  
For p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of  r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  m u l t i -  
c r i t e r i a  l i n e a r  programming, a  combinat ion  o f  f u n c t i o n s  (14)  and 
(15)  might  be a l s o  u s e f u l ,  s e e  [ 14 ] .  
Another p r a c t i c a l  form of p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  fu r tc t ions  i s  
r e l a t e d  t o  a  t y p i c a l  p rocedure  i n  g o a l  programming, where one of 
t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  i s  minimized, s u b j e c t  t o  v a r i a b l e  a t t a i n a b l e  
l e v e l s  of a s p i r a t i o n  f o r  o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e s  t r e a t e d  a s  c o n s t r a i n t s .  
The u s e  of  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s  r e s u l t s  i n  a  more un i -  
v e r s a l  p rocedure  of  t h i s  t y p e ,  s i n c e  t h e  assumed l e v e l s  f o r  o t h e r  
o b j e c t i v e s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  have t o  be a t t a i n a b l e  when u s i n g  
p e n a l t y  t e rms .  To r e p r e s e n t  t h i s  method, it i s  neces sa ry  t o  s p l i t  
t h e  s pace  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  a  C a r t e s i a n  p roduc t  of  t h e  space  R 1  
of  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  o b j e c t i v e ,  and a space  Gr  f o r  o t h e r  ob j ec -  
1  1  1  t i v e s ,  G = R x G r ,  w i t h  D = R+ x D and q  = ( q  , q r ) .  Then t h e  
r 
cor responding  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  is: 
o r ,  i f  d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y  i s  impor tan t :  
I f  t h e  space  G r  i s  H i l b e r t  and D , ~ D : ,  t h e n  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
( 1 5 ) ,  (15a)  are o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g  f o r  any p > 0  and t h e  f u n c t i o n  
( 1  5)  i s  order-approximat ing ( t o  o b t a i n  t h e  o r d e r  approx imat ion  
1  -1 p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n  ( 1 5 a ) ,  one  had t o  s q u a r e  a l s o  q  - q ) .  
The r e f e r e n c e  l e v e l  4' m a t t e r s  a c t u a l l y  on ly  i n  t h e  order-approx- 
im a t i on  p r o p e r t y  s i n c e  it does  n o t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  minimum o f  t h e  
f u n c t i o n s  ( 1  5 )  , (1 5a )  . The r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e  qr E  Gr i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a t t a i n a b l e  and p can be  s m a l l ,  prov ided  it i s  p o s i -  
t i v e ;  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  each  minimal p o i n t  of  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  ( 1 5 ) ,  
(1 5a )  i s  a  D-minimal p o i n t .  
n- 1 n- 1 If Gr = R and Dr = R+ , then any norm can be used in 
(1 5) , (1 5a) . The functions: 
n 
(1 7) 1 -1 i -i s(C,q) = q - q + p 1 max (0,q - q  ) 
i=2 
are strictly order-preserving, whereas (1 6) and (1 7) are also 
order-approximating, and the function 
is order-preserving and order-approximating, see [25]. All 
these functions actually express a simple approach to goal pro- 
2 n gramming: treat the objectives q ,...,q as constraints, given 
-n 
aspiration levels G ~ ,  . . . ,q , and introduce penalty components 
for them. But new, compared to typical goal programming, is 
-rl the fact that q2,. . . ,q need not be attainable and that the 
penalty coefficient p need not be increased to infinity, nor 
other iterations on penalty terms need to be performed: even 
2 -2 if some or all of the constraints q - < q , . . . ,qn 5 cn are 
violated, all minimal points of the functions (16), (16a), (17), 
(18) are Pareto-minimal. 
Consider now a practical interactive procedure for choosing 
a Pareto-minimal point, where the actual decisions are made by 
a decision maker and the mathematical model of a given problem 
and the optimization techniques serve only as a tool to help 
him to recognize quickly a relevant part of the Pareto-minimal 
set. 
At the beginning, the decision maker is presented with all 
thc information about the model of the problem he desires -- for 
example, with the minimal levels of objective functions when 
minimized separately, and with the corresponding decisions. 
After that, he is asked to specify the vector of the desired 
- 
- -1 -n levels for all objective functions, qo - (qO , . . . , qO) E R" 
(only the finite-dimensional case is considered here, although 
generalizations to the infinite-dimensional case are possible 
and even have applicational value). 
For each desired objective vector qi, the mathematicalmodel 
and the optimization technique respond with: 
1) The Pareto-minimal attainable objective vector Gi, ob- 
tained through a minimization of the function (12), and the 
corresponding decision variable levels (any other penalty scalar- 
izing function from the previous paragraph can also be used, 
depending on the particular nature of the model); 
2) n other Pareto-minimal attainable objective vectors 
A 
qiIjf j = 1, ..., n, obtained through minimization of the function 
(12) with perturbed reference points: 
where di is the distance between the desired objective vector 
- 
qi and the attainable one bi, e is the jth unit basis vector, j 
and a is a scalar coefficient. Only the case a = 1 is consid- 
ered in the sequel, which corresponds to the widest-spread 
additional information for the decision maker and is also more 
. l i  
difficult to obtain convergence of the procedure. 
To obtain any additional information at the beginning of 
the procedure, the decision maker can change q several times 0 
(without counting it as iterations, i is kept equal 0) and 
analyze the responses. Once he is ready for "real bargaining", 
he specifies a desired objective vector TI, i = 1, and the 
iteration count begins. Now his modifications of the desired 
vector to q i+ 1 from qi are limited by the responses Gi cor- Ij 
responding to qi through two requirements: 
I j 
where B i s  a  p respec i f i ed  parameter. The requirement (21) s t a t e s  
t h a t  t h e  dec i s ion  maker has t o  move a t  l e a s t  some p a r t  of t h e  
d i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  Pare to  s e t ,  t h e  requirement (20) l i m i t s  h i s  d i -  
r e c t i o n s  of movement t o  t h e  simplex spanned by qi and Cji 
t j -  
Actual ly,  t h e  dec i s ion  maker should n o t  be bothered by techni -  
c a l i t i e s  ( 2 0 ) ,  ( 2 1 ) ;  it is s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  he i s  informed about 
them and, a f t e r  he has s p e c i f i e d  any qiclt a  complementary auto- 
- 
matic  procedure p r o j e c t s  qi+l - qi on Si t o  s a t i s f y  (20) and 
a d j u s t s  i ts l eng th  t o  s a t i s f y  ( 2 1 ) ,  i f  necessary.  
The above procedure and l i m i t a t i o n s  of t h e  adjustments of 
t h e  d e s i r a b l e  o b j e c t i v e  v e c t o r  qi a r e  depic ted  i n  Figure 5.  
FIGURE 5. ILLUSTRATION OF THE INTERACTIVE PROCEDURE OF MULTIOBJECTIVE 
OPTIMIZATION. SHADED REGION DENOTES THE SET OF ADMISSIBLE <. 
~t i s  c l e a r  from F i g u r e  5 t h a t ,  once t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker has  
s p e c i f i e d  ;ill he can u s u a l l y  o b t a i n  from t h i s  p o i n t  on ly  a  l i m i t e d  
p a r t  o f  t h e  Pareto-minimal s e t  Q 0 ' T h i s  i s  bo th  weakness and 
s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  p rocedure .  The weakness can be compensated by 
t h e  i n i t i a l ,  e x p l o r a t o r y  p a r t  o f  t h e  p rocedure ,  where t h e  dec i -  
s i o n  maker can g a t h e r  a s  much i n fo rma t ion  a s  he wishes .  The 
s t r e n g t h  c o n s i s t s  p r e c i s e l y  o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p rocedure  
t o  t h e  r e g i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker. Observe t h a t  
t h i s  r eg ion  would dec rea se  i f  a w e r e  s m a l l e r  t h a n  1 .  
The c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  convergence f o r  t h i s  procedure  a r e  
g iven  by t h e  fo l l owing  lemma: 
Lemma 7 (Convergence o f  t h e  I n t e r a c t i v e  M u l t i c r i t e r i a  
Opt imiza t ion  P rocedu re ) .  Suppose  t h e  s e t  o f  a t t a i n a b l e  
n n  
o b j e c t i v e s  Qo i s  c o n v e x ,  G = E , D = E+ ( t h e  norm u s e d  i n  
s c a l a r i z a t i o n  i s  E u c l i d e a n ) .  Then ,  f o r  any  a, B E ( 0 ; l  I ,  
t h e  p roced u re  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e  w i t h  r e q u i r e m e n t s  ( 1 9 ) ,  ( 2 0 ) ,  
1 2 1 )  i s  c o n v e r g e n t ,  t h a t  i s ,  l i m  di = 0. 
i + c n  
The proof o f  t h i s  new though n o t  v e r y  a s t o n i s h i n g  r e s u l t  
i s  g iven  i n  t h e  Appendix. The lemma can  probably  be  proved f o r  
o t h e r  t h a n  Euc l idean  norms i n  R". Observe t h a t  i f  t h e  r e q u i r e -  
ment (20) w e r e  s u b s t i t u t e d  by a  s imp le r  one, f o r  example, 
- - n 
q i +  1 - q i ~ R + ,  one cou ld  dev i semoves  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker which 
would r e s u l t  i n  d ivergence .  But t h e s e  moves would a l s o  be  un- 
reasonab le  from h i s  p o i n t  o f  view and, count ing  on h i s  reason-  
a b i l i t y ,  w e  can s i m p l i f y  t h e  requ i rements  ( 2 0 ) ,  ( 2 1 ) ,  o r  even 
simply d rop  them a sk ing  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker t o  move g e n e r a l l y  i n  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P a r e t o - s e t .  
I n  t h e  lemma w e  d i d  n o t  assume any p re f e r ence -o rde r ing  o r  
under ly ing  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  behav io r  o f  t h e  de- 
c i s i o n  maker, and w e  d i d  n o t  conclude any th ing  abou t  t h e  f i n a l  
p o i n t  o f  t h e  procedure ,  3, = l i m  G i ,  a l t hough  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
l+=' 
such a  l i m i t  i s  easy  t o  prove.  From a  pu re ly  mathemat ica l  p o i n t  
of  view, i t  would be i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  examine under  which assump- 
t i o n s  on t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker ' s  behav ior  w e  can prove t h a t  G, 
a c t u a l l y  maximizes ( o r  minimizes)  h i s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  From a  
pragmatical  po in t  of view, such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  would only  
confuse t h e  i s s u e  s i n c e  t h e  underlying motivat ion of t h e  i n t e r -  
a c t i v e  procedure i s  t o  f i n d  a  compromise d i r e c t l y  i n  terms of 
goa l s ,  n o t  i n  t e r m s  of u t i l i t y  func t ions .  Also, we do not  expec t  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker playing wi th  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  procedure u n t i l  
i + - i  experiments show t h a t  he very soon accep t s  some Gi ,  p u t t i n g  
- 
- 
q i +  I - 4, and t h u s  s topping t h e  procedure.  A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  he  
can a l s o  be informed on t h e  t r ade -o f f s  implied by h i s  dec i s ion :  
h 
weighting c o e f f i c i e n t s  A i  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p o i n t  ai can be computed 
from equat ion  ( 1  1 ) . 
Observe a l s o  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  procedure does n o t  depend 
on t h e  s c a l i n g  o r  ranges f o r  s e p a r a t e  o b j e c t i v e  func t ions .  Nat- 
u r a l l y ,  t h e  s c a l i n g  must be reasonable  i n  o rde r  n o t  t o  impede 
computational e f f i c i e n c y  nor expos i t ion  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  t o  t h e  
dec i s ion  maker, and it i s  adv i sab le  t o  u s e  s c a l e s  t h a t  correspond 
t o  approximately equa l  ranges of a t t a i n a b l e  va lues  of o b j e c t i v e  
func t ions .  But t h i s  requirement of  a  reasonable  s c a l i n g  does n o t  
imply an a  p r i o r i  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  a  v e c t o r  of weighting c o e f f i -  
c i e n t s ,  and t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  i n v a r i a n t  t o  t h e  s c a l i n g  
t r ans fonna t ion  ( a f t e r  changing s c a l e s ,  bo th  Gi and a  p o s t e r i o r i  
determined R i  -- i f  n o t  normalized -- change p r o p o r t i o n a l l y ) .  
3 .  APPLICATION AREAS OF REFERENCE OBJECTIVES AND PENALTY 
SCALARIZATION 
I n  t y p i c a l  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  op t imiza t ion ,  pena l ty  s c a l a r i z a -  
t i o n  can be used n o t  only i n  i n t e r a c t i v e  procedures of  d e c i s i o n  
making bu t  a l s o  i n  analyzing p o s s i b l e  outcomes. For example, a  
t y p i c a l  quest ion:  i s  a given d e c i s i o n  P a r e t o - e f f i c i e n t ,  o r  n o t ? -  
can be convenient ly  reso lved  by applying Lemma 4 ,  whi le  an ap- 
p l i c a t i o n  of weighting c o e f f i c i e n t s  r e s u l t s  i n  r a t h e r  complicated 
procedures.  
One must bear  i n  mind however, t h a t  a  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  i s  n o t  
P a r e t o - e f f i c i e n t  i n  t h e  op t imiza t ion  model might be Pareto-  
e f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker, f o r  va r ious  reasons.  F i r s t ,  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker might cons ider  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  -- f o r  example, 
of a e s t h e t i c a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  n a t u r e - - t h a n  t h o s e  exp re s sed  by t h e  
model. Second, t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker might  have i n t u i t i v e l y  a  more 
p r e c i s e  assessment  of  v a r i o u s  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  etc. ,  o n l y  inadequa- 
t e l y  exp r e s sed  by t h e  model. Consequent ly ,  by l ook ing  a t  t h e  
o p t i m i z a t i o n  model o n l y  as a  t o o l  t o  a i d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker,  it 
i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  ana lyze  t h e s e  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n s  f u r t h e r ,  and 
r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  c e r t a i n l y  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t h a n  we igh t i ng  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  such  an  a n a l y s i s .  However, much ha s  t o  be  done 
y e t  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  o f  r e s e a r c h .  
Another conven i en t  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  func- 
t i o n s  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of  m u l t i c r i t e r i a  problems i s  t h e  scann ing  
of t h e  P a r e t o  se t ,  n a t u r a l l y  under  t h e  assumpt ion t h a t  t h e  num- 
b e r  of  c r i t e r i a  is n o t  t o o  l a r g e .  S c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
t y p e  ( 1 6 ) , ( 1 6 a ) , ( 1 7 ) , ( 1 8 )  can  be  used f o r  t h i s  purpose .  An 
example of  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  c o n t r o l  e n g i n e e r i n g ,  see Wierzb ick i  
1978 [ 2 5 ] ,  s h o w s t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  we igh t ing  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  t h a t  
purpose  can  l e a d  t o  d i s a s t r o u s  r e s u l t s ,  w h i l e  r e f e r e n c e  ob jec -  
t i v e s  g i v e  r e l i a b l e  answers .  T h i s  is d e p i c t e d  i n  F i g u r e  6. 
FIGURE 6. REFERENCE O B J E C T I V E S  VERSUS WEIGHTING C O E F F I C I E N T S  
WHEN SCANNING AN IRREGULARLY SHAPED PARETO - S E T  
I n  many a p p l i c a t i o n s  of  dynamic model l ing,  sca la r -va lued  
o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  do n o t  p r e c i s e l y  exp res s  t h e  g o a l s  of a  
d e c i s i o n  maker o r  a model ler .  Of primary i n t e r e s t  i s  o f t e n  a 
f u n c t i o n  of  t i m e ,  a t r a j e c t o r y  of  t h e  model. For example, an 
economist  might want t o  compare t h e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  o f  i n f l a t i o n  
rates and of  GNP whi l e  n o t  being ready t o  average  them and t o  
use  s c a l a r  i n d i c e s ,  Thus, a function of time is an equally 
reasonable goal in decision making as a scalar index, and ana- 
l y s t s  avoided t h e  use  of f u n c t i o n s  as g o a l s  on ly  because o f  t h e  
l ack  of  a p p r o p r i a t e  t echniques ,  However, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  us ing 
r e f e r e n c e  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  a  H i l b e r t  space p rov ides  f o r  an appro- 
p r i a t e  t echnique .  This  i s  expla ined  i n  F igu re  7 where, as a 
g o a l ,  an economist s p e c i f i e d  a  d e s i r a b l e  GNP and a reasonable  
i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  a s  f u n c t i o n s  of  t i m e .  A model a f t e r  an optimiza- 
t i o n ,  s ay ,  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  t a x e s ,  responds by a t t a i n a b l e  (and, i n  
a  sense ,  Pareto-opt imal)  f u n c t i o n s  o f  GNP and i n f l a t i o n ,  and t h e  
economist can modify t hen  h i s  r e f e rence  f u n c t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e  outcomes. 
A 
GNP I R  
I 
I 
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+ Time L 
FIGURE 7. FUNCTIONS OF TIME OR TRAJECTORIES AS REFERENa OBJECTIVES 
I f  t h e  dynamic model i s  t ime-cont inuous ,  a s  d e p i c t e d  i n  
CI 
Fi gu r e  7 ,  t h e n  we might  choose ,  f o r  example, t h e  L' [O;T] space  
f o r  a n a l y s i s ,  which r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  fo l l owing  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  
s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  (8a )  : 
1  
s (q.q)  = - 1  ( (q (t) - 6' (t) ) * + (q2  (t) - q2 (t) ) 2 ,  d t  
1  
where ( a ) +  = max(OI8)  and t h e  change t o  ( ( t )  q  ( t ) )+  i n s t e a d  
1  
o f  (q (t)  -q l  ( t ) )+  r e s u l t s  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we maximize GNP 
and p e n a l i z e  t h e  GNP-t ra jec tory  i f  it s t a y s  below t h e  d e s i r a b l e  
l e v e l .  W e  can  a l s o  u s e  more g e n e r a l  space s  and o t h e r  norms-- 
f o r  example, t h e  Chebychev n o r m - - i f  w e  t a k e  i n t o  accoun t  t h e  
r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  Wie rzb i ck i  1977, [23] . 
But most p r a c t i c a l  dynamic models a r e  t i m e - d i s c r e t e  and an  
1  2 
economist  might  be  i n t e r e s t e d  on ly  i n  q ( t)  and q  (t) f o r  t = 
0 1  T Then t h e  problem is  i n  f a c t  f i n i t e - d i m e n s i o n a l  and 
w e  do  n o t  need t h e  H i l b e r t  space  fo rmu la t i on ;  a l l  forms o f  
p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  p r e v i o u s  pa ragraphs  
a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  such  a  c a s e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  number 
- 
1  2 2 
of  o b j e c t i v e s  q  0  q  1  , q  ( 1  I q ( 0 )  ~q  1 )  I ( 1  might  
be q u i t e  l a r g e  and it i s  conven i en t  t o  t h i n k  t h e n  i n  t e rms  of  
d i s c r e t e - t i m e  t r a j e c t o r i e s ,  n o t  i n  te rms of  s e p a r a t e  o b j e c t i v e s .  
The i d e a  of  r e f e r e n c e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  has  been a p p l i e d  and 
found u s e f u l  i n  a  s t u d y  on  t h e  F i n n i s h  f o r e s t r y  i n d u s t r i a l  
s e c t o r  ( K a l l i o  and ~ewandowsk i ,  1979, [1 41 ) . 
There  a r e  many approaches  t o  f i n d i n g  p a r e t o - e q u i l i b r i a  o r  
compromises i n  c o o p e r a t i v e  games. Mot ivated  by t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  
t h a t ,  i n  r e a l i t y ,  a  group o f  d e c i s i o n  makers p r e f e r s ,  f i r s t ,  t o  
d i s c u s s ,  b a r g a i n  and a g r e e  abou t  g o a l s ,  a n  agreement-a id ing 
p rocedure  ba sed  o n  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  space  of o b j e c t i v e s  
h a s  been dev i s ed .  
Thi s  procedure  i s  expla ined  i n  F igu re  8 i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  two 
d e c i s i o n  makers and two objective fu i~ct   ion^. Faeh W ~ i e  irrn makJ+- 
has its "ownN o b j e c t i v e  func t ion ,khe  l e v e l s  of  which however do 
1 1 2 2 
n o t  only  depend on h i s  dec i s ions :  q = q (xl  ,x2)  and q  = q2(x1  , x  ) .  
It  i s  a l s o  assumed t h a t  t h i s  i s  a c a s e  of  f u l l  in format ion  and 
each d e c i s i o n  maker f u l l y  unders tands  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  and p o s s i b l e  
a c t i o n s  of t h e  o t h e r  one. Moreover, t h e  cho ice  o f  model d e c i s i o n s  
x1 ,x2  i s  d e l e g a t e d  t o  an op t imiza t ion  procedure  based on t h e  math- 
ema t i ca l  model; t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers on ly  s t a t e  and t r y  t o  ag ree  
on r e f e rence  o b j e c t i v e  l e v e l s .  Each o f  them i s  asked t h u s  t o  
-1 -2 
s p e c i f y  h i s  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t  qiO = (qiolqiO ) ,  i = 1 , 2 ,  which ex- 
. p r e s se s  h i s  judgment about  h i s  own a s p i r a t i o n  level  and t h a t  of 
h i s  p a r t n e r ;  l a t e r ,  t h e s e  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t s  are modif ied i n  an 
i t e r a t i v e  procedure  t o  cij u n t i l  e i t h e r  l i m  q = l i m  q2 o r  t h e  
,+a 1 j ,+a 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  break down d i s p l a y i n g  an adversary  s i t u a t i o n .  
FIGURE 8. AN AGREEMENT-AIDING PROCEDURE BASED ON REFERENCE OBJECTIVES 
Suppose, t h e  f i r s t  d e c i s i o n  maker w i t h  a  dominant ob jec -  
1 -1 -2 t i v e  t o  minimize q  , h a s  s p e c i f i e d  q1 = ( q l  , q l  0 )  n a t u r a l l y  
a l l o t t i n g  a  r e l a t i v e l y  lower l e v e l  f o r  4; h i s  'own" o b j e c t i v e  
-2 t h a n  f o r  q I 0 ,  t h e  one of h i s  p a r t n e r .  Cor responding ly ,  t h e  
-1 -2 p o i n t  c20 = ( q 2 0 , q 2 0 )  s p e c i f i e d  by t h e  second d e c i s i o n  maker 
-1 -1 -2 -2 has  > q 1 0  and q20  < q l O ,  because he  i s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
2 minimizing h i s  "own" o b f e c t i v e  q  . 
Since  w e  can assume, a t  t h e  beginning,  no th ing  else t h a n  
t h e  e q u i t y  of each  d e c i s i o n  maker ' s  r equ i r emen t s ,  t h e  agreement- 
a i d i n g  procedure  s imply de te rmines  % a s  t h e  midd le -po in t  of 
- 
t h e  segment [ c l  0 ;  q20]  ( o r  of  a  corresponding s implex i n  ca se  
o f  more d e c i s i o n  makers)  and responds  th rough  a  min imiza t ion  
o f  one of t h e  p e n a l t y  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n s  from p r e v i o u s  para-  
g raphs  by a  P a r e t o  p o i n t  Go corresponding t o  % a s  w e l l  a s  by 
- 
P a r e t o  p o i n t s  Q1 $20 cor responding  t o  6, 0 ,q20 .  Th i s  way bo th  
d e c i s i o n  makers have a  p r o p o s i t i o n  of compromise and i n fo rma t ion  
about  a t t a i n a b l e  l e v e l s  o f  o b j e c t i v e s .  The d i s t a n c e s  d10 = 
- - lk0 - O1 I and d20 = llQO - q2011 a r e  a l s o  determined.  
Now bo th  d e c i s i o n  makers have t o  make conces s ions  i n  terms 
of two s c a l a r s  a l  , a 2  E [ B ;  1 ] , where B E (0 ;  1 ] i s  a  p r e s p e c i f i e d  
minimal concess ion  l e v e l .  The modif ied  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t s  ;ill, 
- 
92 1  a r e  determined by 
Thus, bo th  d e c i s i o n  makers have t o  move i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of 6 
1' 
a t  l e a s t  B t i m e s  t h e  d i s t a n c e  d i j .  I n  F igu re  8 ,  it was assumed 
t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  d e c i s i o n  maker made on ly  t h e  minimal concess ion  
a l  = B ,  whi l e  t h e  second dec ided  t o  make a  b i g g e r  one,  a 2  > B .  
When G1 
, j+ l  and G 2 ,  j+l a r e  determined,  t h e  p rocedure  i s  r epea t ed .  
The mechanism o f  t h i s  p rocedure  ve ry  s t r o n g l y  u r g e s  bo th  
d e c i s i o n  makers t o  r e a c h  an agreement. T h e r e f o r e ,  a t  some s t a g e  
of t h e  p rocedure ,  one o r  b o t h  of t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers can dec ide  
i f  he should  break t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  n o t  making any 
f u r t h e r  concess ions .  Two f u r t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  can be env isaged :  
e i t h e r  bo th  d e c i s i o n  makers ag ree  on e n t e r i n g  nego t i -  
a t i o n s  w i t h  modif ied r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t s  qiO; 
o r  an a d d i t i o n a l  i n f luence - r evea l ing  procedure i s  
c a l l e d  f o r .  This  procedure  can c o n s i s t  f o r  example 
of a  one-sided game of t h e  d i s s i d e n t  d e c i s i o n  maker 
" a g a i n s t  t h e  computer", where t h e  d i s s i d e n t  d e c i s i o n  
maker d e f i n e s  h i s  d e c i s i o n s ,  s a y  x l ,  on h i s  own wh i l e  
t h e  op t imiza t ion  procedure  tries t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
o t h e r  ( o r  o t h e r s )  d e c i s i o n  maker and choose x2 t o  
o b t a i n  t h e  b e s t  ba rga in .  Var ious  r u l e s  concerning 
t h e  sequence of d e c i s i o n  making and t h e  u s e  of  out-  
comes i n  r e s t a r t i n g  n e g o t i a t i o n s  can be in t roduced  
here .  
Much has  t o  be  done y e t  i n  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e  agreement-aiding procedure.  An a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  s tudy  
of t h e  F inn i sh  f o r e s t r y  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  has g iven  i n t e r e s t i n g  
r e s u l t s  --see K a l l i o  and Lewandowski, 1979. [14]. 
There a r e  s e v e r a l  p ragmat ica l  problems i n  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of  
op t imiz ing  t echn iques  t h a t  c a l l  f o r  t h e  u se  of r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t s .  
Many s i n g l e - o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  models r e p r e s e n t  problems i n  
which o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e s  occur  b u t  a r e  deemed no t  v e r y  impor t an t -  
u n t i l  t h e  s i n g l e - o b j e c t i v e  s o l u t i o n  i s  p re sen ted  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
maker and found unacceptable  f o r  v a r i o u s  reasons .  A c l a s s i c a l  
example of such a s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of dynamic l i n e a r  
programming problems f o r  economic planning.  S ince  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  
of l i n e a r  programming problems correspond t o  v e r t i c e s  of  a  s implex,  
some c r u c i a l  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s  o f t e n  t e n d  t o  t a k e  on-off char-  
a c t e r ;  exagge ra t ing ,  t h e  "opt imal"  s o l u t i o n  can be o f t e n  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  a s  " f i r s t  i n v e s t  a l l  GNP f o r  two y e a r s  and do n o t  consume, 
then  do n o t  i n v e s t  f o r  t h r e e  y e a r s  and consume a l l  GNP." C l e a r l y ,  
such an "op t imal"  s o l u t i o n  would be never accepted by a  d e c i s i o n  
maker; t h e  tendency of l i n e a r  programming models t o  produce such 
s o l u t i o n s  i s  one of  t h e  r ea sons  of a  wide-spread c r i t i q u e  of u s ing  
op tmiza t ion  models a t  a l l .  But t h e r e  i s  a l s o  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  
t h a t  l i n e a r  models, however convenient  i n  handl ing ,  d e s c r i b e  
r e a l  problems i n a c c u r a t e l y .  The remedy i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t o  
i n t r o d u c e  n o n l i n e a r i t i e s  i n t o  t h e  model;  sometimes even a l i n e a r  
model can be a d e q u a t e  i f  c o n s t r u c t e d  a c c u r a t e l y  t o  e x p r e s s  a c t u a l  
g o a l s  and c o n s t r a i n t s .  
An i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  o t h e r  o p t i m i z a t i o n  c r i t e r i a  b e i n g  ac- 
counted  f o r  by w e i g h t i n g  c o e f f i c i e n t s  d o e s  n o t  s o l v e  t h e  problem; 
t h e  weighted  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  remains  l i n e a r  and t e n d s  a g a i n  
t o  produce on-off  s o l u t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a wide ly  u s e d  approach 
i s  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  l i m i t i n g  t h e  set o f  
a d m i s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s .  T h i s  i s  i n  f a c t  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  g o a l  pro- 
gramming: a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  f o r  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  are de te rmined  
and used  as c o n s t r a i n t s ,  f o r  example,  by demanding t h a t  i n v e s t -  
ments and consumption each  y e a r  s h o u l d  n o t  be  less t h a n  g i v e n  
l e v e l s .  But t h i s  approach h a s  a l l  drawbacks o f  g o a l  programming: 
t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  must b e  a t t a i n a b l e  i n  o r d e r  n o t  t o  make 
t h e  set  of f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s  empty, and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t h e r e -  
f o r e  t o  d e v i s e  i n t e r a c t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  d e c i s i o n  makers s e t t i n g  
a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s .  
The n a t u r a l  remedy i s  t h e n  t o  use  p e n a l t y - s c a l a r i z i n g  
approach.  I f  any r e f e r e n c e  t r a j e c t o r y  i s  de te rmined  -- f o r  
example,  concluded from consumption and i n v e s t m e n t s  from t h e  
p a s t - - t h e n  t h e  problem might  be  f o r m u l a t e d  as o p t i m i z i n g  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  p l u s  a  p e n a l t y  t e r m  f o r  n o t  a t t a i n -  
i n g  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  t r a j e c t o r y .  T h i s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  u s e  of  
a  s c a l a r i z i n g  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  t y p e  (16)  , ( 1  6 a )  , ( 1  7 )  o r  (18)  ; 
a s  mentioned b e f o r e ,  problems w i t h  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  of t h e  
t y p e  (1 7 )  , ( 1  8 )  can  be r e f o r m u l a t e d  back t o  l i n e a r  programming 
problems.  
Another  p o s s i b l e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  
o b j e c t i v e  approach i s  t h e  problem of  r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n .  The typ-  
i c a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  approach t o  r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n  o f t e n  f a i l s  
i n  a p p l i c a t i o n s ;  see, f o r  example, t h e  p a p e r  o f  Tversky i n  B e l l ,  
Keeney and R a i f f a  1977,  [ 2 ] .  One o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  is  t h a t  de- 
c i s i o n  makers seem t o  i n t u i t i v e l y  e v a l u a t e  e n t i r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  i n s t e a d  of  j u s t  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y .  But t h e n  e n t i r e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  can  be used as g o a l s  e i t h e r  i n  H i l b e r t  
s p a c e ,  i f  c o n t i n u o u s ,  or i n  R", i f  d i s c r e t i z e d .  
Consider a  problem of s tandard  de terminat ion  where a  given 
set of  s tandards  - - f o r  example, on a i r  po l lu t ion - -de te rmines  
cond i t iona l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of hazards - - f o r  example, of m o r t a l i t y  
and morbidity.  Each s tandard  l e v e l  corresponds a l s o  t o  some 
c o s t s ,  and a  procedure of s tandard determinat ion i s  supposedto  
compare c o s t s  t o  hazards.  Many economic, s o c i a l  and moral 
i s s u e s  a r e  involved i n  t h e  comparison, making it extremely d i f -  
f i c u l t .  But t h e  po in t  is  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e  
c l a s s i c a l  u t i l i t y  approach of t h e  problem. One o f  t h e  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e s  i s  a  d i r e c t  eva lua t ion  of p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  and 
c o s t s  by determining a  d e s i r a b l e  shape of  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  an 
acceptable  l e v e l  of t h e  c o s t ,  using them a s  r e fe rence  o b j e c t i v e s  
i n  a  pena l ty  s c a l a r i z a t i o n ,  and changing t h e  r e fe rence  o b j e c t i v e s  
t o  an i n t e r a c t i v e  procedure.  
4 .  CONCLUSIONS 
The motivat ion of t h i s  paper i s  t h a t  of  a  toolmaker. 
Systems a n a l y s i s  and dec i s ion  sc i ence  can be compared t o  t o o l s  
t h a t  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  complex problems of modern s o c i e t y .  
Tools must be checked a g a i n s t  r e a l  problems. I f  t h e r e  a r e  
complaints about t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of  t o o l s ,  then t h e  toolmaker 
should reexamine and redesign them. When he i s  doing so  and 
f i n d s  a  new p r i n c i p l e  of  t o o l  cons t ruc t ion  he should be s a t i s -  
f i e d - - b u t  no t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  of  f o r g e t t i n g  t h a t  he i s  construc- 
t i n g  t o o l s  which must aga in  be checked i n  p r a c t i c e  and f u r t h e r  
developed. 
While t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  of t h e  use  of r e fe rence  objec- 
t i v e s  and pena l ty  s c a l a r i z a t i o n  a r e  r a t h e r  we l l  developed, a s  
represented  i n  t h e  f i r s t  chapter  of t h e  paper,  t h e r e  a r e  s t i l l  
many t a s k s  t o  which they can be appl ied .  
REFERENCES 
A c k o f f ,  R.L., The F u t u r e  o f  O p e r a t i o n a l  R e s e a r c h  i s  P a s t ,  
O p e r a t i o n a l  R e s e a r c h  S o c i e t y ,  V o l .  30 ,  93-104,  1979 .  
B e l l ,  D.E., R.L. Keeney ,  a n d  H.  R a i f f a ,  C o n f l i c t i n g  
O b j e c t i v e s  i n  D e c i s i o n s ,  Wiley/IIASA I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
S e r i e s  o n  A p p l i e d  S y s t e m s  A n a l y s i s ,  New York,  1977 .  
Cohn,  J . L .  a n d  D . H .  Marks ,  A Review a n d  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  
M u l t i o b j e c t i v e  Programming T e c h n i q u e s ,  Water  R e s o u r c e s  
R e s e a r c h ,  V o l .  1 1 ,  208-220,  A p r i l  1975 .  
D a  Cunha,  N.O. a n d  E. P o l a k ,  C o n s t r a i n e d  M i n i m i s a t i o n  
u n d e r  V e c t o r - V a l u e d  C r i t e r i a  i n  F i n i t e  D i m e n s i o n a l  
S p a c e ,  J o u r n a l  of  M a t h e m a t i c a l  A n a l y s i s  a n d  A p p l i -  
c a t i o n s ,  V o l .  1 9 ,  103-124,  1967 .  
Deb reu ,  G . ,  Theory  of  V a l u e ,  W i l e y ,  New York ,  1959 .  
Dye r ,  J . S . ,  I n t e r a c t i v e  Goa l  Programming,  Management 
S c i e n c e ,  V o l .  1 9 ( 1 ) ,  62-70,  March 1972 .  
F i s h b u r n ,  P.C. U t i l i t y  Theory f o r  D e c i s i o n  Making,  
W i l e y ,  New Yo rk ,  1970 .  
G e o f f r i o n ,  A.M. ,  P r o p e r  E f f i c i e n c y  a n d  t h e  T h e o r y  o f  
V e c t o r  M a x i m i z a t i o n ,  J o u r n a l  of M a t h e m a t i c a l  A n a l y s i s  
a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n s ,  V o l .  22 ,  816-630,  1968 .  
H a i m e s ,  Y . Y . ,  W.A. H a l l ,  a n d  H.T. Freedman,  M u l t i o b j e c t i v e  
O p t i m i z a t i o n  i n  Water  R e s o u r c e s  Sys tems:  The 
s u r r o g a t e  Worth Trade-off  ~ e t h o d  ,- ~ l s e v i e r ,  New York ,  
1975 .  
H o ,  Y.C. ,  D i f f e r e n t i a l  G a m e s ,  Dynamic O p t i m i z a t i o n  and  
G e n e r a l i s e d  C o n t r o l  Theory,  J O T A ,  V o l .  6 ( 2 )  , 
179-209, 1970. 
I n t r i l i g a t o r ,  M .D. ,  Mathemat ica l  O p t i m i z a t i o n  and Economic 
Theory, P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  Englewood C l i f f s ,  N . J . ,  1971. 
Keeney, R.L. and H. R a i f f a ,  Dec i s ions  wi th  M u l t i p l e  
O b j e c t i v e s :  P r e f e r e n c e s  and Va l u e  Trade-offs ,  
Wiley , New York, 1  976. 
Kornb lu th ,  J.H.S., A Survey o f  Goal  Programming, Omega, 
V o l .  1 ,  193-205, 1973. 
K a l l i o ,  M. and A. Lewandowski, Reference p o i n t  o p t i m i -  
z a t i o n  f o r  compromise f i n d i n g  i n  t h e  development  
of t h e  F i n n i s h  f o r e s t r y  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r ,  IIASA WP, 
1  979, i n  p r e p a r a t i o n .  
Lei tmann,  G .  and W. Schmi tendor f ,  Some S u f f i c i e n t  Con- 
d i t i o n s  f o r  Pare to-Opt imal  C o n t r o l ,  J o u r n a l  of 
Dynamical Systems, Measurement and C o n t r o l ,  
V o l .  9 5 ( 3 ) ,  1973. 
Moreau, J.J., ~ 6 c o m p o s i t i o n  o r t h o g o n a l e  d ' u n  e s p a c e  
h i l b e r t i e n  s e l o n  deux c a n e s  mutue l l ement  p o l a i r e s ,  
C. R .  Ac. S c i .  , V o l .  225, 238-240, P a r i s ,  1962.  
Nash, J . F . ,  The B a r g a i n i n g  Problem, Econometrics, 
V o l .  1 8 ,  155-162, 1950. 
P a r e t o ,  V . ,  Cours dlEconomie P o l i t i q u e ,  Rouge, Lausanne,  
1896. 
P e s c h e l ,  M. and C .  R i e d e l ,  P o l y o p t i m i z a t i o n  - a  D e c i s i o n  
Making Aid f o r  T e c h n i c a l  E n g i n e e r i n g  Compromise 
S o l u t i o n s ,  ( i n  German) VEB Verlag Technik ,  B e r l i n ,  
1975. 
Savlukadze ,  M.E., O p t i m i z a t i o n  o f  Vector F u n c t i o n a l s .  
P a r t  I: Programming o f  Optimal  T r a j e c t o r i e s ,  
Avtomatika i Telemekhanika,  N o .  8 ,  5-15. 
P a r t  111: The A n a l y t i c  C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  Opt imal  
C o n t r o l s ,  Ibidem, N o .  9,  5-15 ( i n  R u s s i a n ) ,  1971. 
Savlukadze ,  M.E.,  On t h e  E x i s t e n c e  o f  S o l u t i o n s  i n  
Problems o f  O p t i m i z a t i o n  Under Vector-Valued 
C r i t e r i a ,  J o u r n a l  of O p t i m i z a t i o n  Theory a n d  
A p p l i c a t i o n s ,  V o l .  13  ( 2 ) ,  1974. 
W i e r z b i c k i ,  A.P., P e n a l t y  Methods i n  S o l v i n g  O p t i m i z a t i o n  
Problems w i t h  Vector Performance  C r i t e r i a ,  
P r o c e e d i n g s  of VI-th IFAC World Congress ,  Cambridge/ 
Boston,  1975. 
123 1 W i e r z b i c k i ,  A .  P . ,  B a s i c  P r o p e r t i e s  o f  S c a l a r i z i n g  
F u n c t i o n a l s  f o r  M u l t i o b j e c t i v e  O p t i m i z a t i o n ,  Mathe- 
rna t i s che  O p e r a t i o n s ,  Forlschung und S t a t i s t i k ,  S e r .  
O p t i m i z a t i o n ,  Vol .  8  ( I ) ,  55-60, 1977.  
[241 W i e r z b i c k i ,  A . P .  a n d  S t .  Kurcyusz ,  P r o j e c t i o n  on  a Cone, 
P e n a l t y  F u n c t i o n a l s  a n d  D u a l i t y  Theory  f o r  P r o b l e m s  
w i t h  I n e q u a l i t y  C o n s t r a i n t s  i n  H i l b e r t  S p a c e ,  
SIAM J o u r n a l  Con t ro  l a n d  O p t i m i z a t i o n ,  Vol .  1 5 ,  
25-26, 1977 .  
[25]  W i e r z b i c k i ,  A.P., On t h e  U s e  of  P e n a l t y  F u n c t i o n s  i n  
M u l t i o b j e c t i v e  O p t i m i z a t i o n ,  P r o c e e d i n g s  of t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Symposium on O p e r a t i o n s  R e s e a r c h ,  
Mannheim, 1978 .  
[261 Yu, P.L. a n d  G .  Le i tmann ,  Compromise S o l u t i o n s ,  Dominat ion 
S t r u c t u r e s  a n d  S a v l u k a d z e ' s  S o l u t i o n ,  J o u r n a l  of 
O p t i m i z a t i o n  Theory a n d  A p p l i c a t i o n s ,  V o l .  1 3 ,  
362-378, 1974 .  
APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 7 
The nature of the lemma calls for a geometrical proof. 
Consider the intersection of the positive orthant E:, where the 
origin of the space is shifted to <, with the ball of radius di. 
The ball is then tangent to the convex set Q0 and to the Pareto 
set Go -- cf. Figure 5. 
- 
Choose such j that the angle between the vectors qi 
-qi 
- , 1 
and ai-qi is maximal and consider the two-dimensional linear 
manifold spanned by these vectors (Figure 9). 
FIGURE 9. A GEOMETRICAL CONSTRUCTION FOR THE PROOF 
In this plane, construct a line P separating the cut of the 
ball with the origin at Ti and radius di from the cut of the 
A 
convex set QO. Project the point Ti on this line to obtain 
22 5 ,I - 
. Construct points qij and aij on the vectors Gij -qi Gi,j A - and 
qij -qi in such a way that their distance from Ti is also di. 
Now, since QO is convex, the angle between the vectors 
5 - - - qij - qi and Gi - qi is greater than the angle between 6ij - q. and 
A A 
1 
qi-qi, which in turn was assumed to be the greatest for all j. 
- - 
- 
5 Moreover, qij qij is parallel to Gi - qi, qi - ei is orthogonal 
- - 
t o  them, and qij - q i  and Gi - qi  a r e  bo th  o f  t h e  l e n g t h  d i .  
A 
Th e r e f o r e ,  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  q .  . - q i  i s  s m a l l e r  t h a n  di and t h e  
- 
a n g l e  between qij  - qi  and qi  - q i  smaller t h a n  T / 4  r a d i a n s .  
Thus, t h e  d i s t a n c e  between zij and Gi can be  e s t i m a t e d  by 
which i s  t h e  l e n g t h  of  a  s e c a n t  f o r  a  ci rc le ,  cor responding  t o  
I I t h e  a n g l e  2 . 
Now, c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o i n t  8 ijf3 d i s t a n t  f3di from qi on t h e  
- 
v e c t o r  - qi.  Again, th rough  p u r e l y  g e o m e t r i c a l  cons ide r a -  i j 
t i o n  t h e  d i s t a n c e  from $ijB t o  Gi can be  e s t i m a t e d  by: 
However, i f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker chooses  h i s  n e x t  q .  ac- 1+  1 
co r d ing  t o  t h e  r u l e s  (20)  , (21 ) , t h e n  t h e  d i s t a n c e  di+l - 
- 
II Gi+ - q i + l  11 c l e a r l y  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  (see F i g u r e  9): 
A - A A A h 
1+1 - I < max (llqij -qill ,YPijf3 -gill) (A31 dm < l I q i - q i + l , -  
NOW, f o r  each f3 E ( 0 ;1 ]  w e  can choose  a  s c a l a r  
t t [ l  - G - l  2 n ; i - q ] c  ( 0 ; l )  such t h a t  
Th e r e f o r e ,  l i m  di = 0. It was assumed i n  t h e  proof t h a t  < i $ Z ~ o .  
1 +a, 
However, t h e  proof  f o r  t h e  c a s e  GiEQO can  be  e a s i l y  supplemented 
and i s ,  moreover,  unnecessa ry  s i n c e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker ha s  ex- 
p l o r a t o r y  moves and w i l l  a lways f i n d  qO$Z~O r e s u l t i n g  i n  cif€Qo 
f o r  a l l  i u n t i l  t h e  i t e r a t i o n s  s t o p .  
